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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENDALL Q. NORTHERN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
N. ELDON BARNES, et al., 
Respondent. 
Case no. 920116 
Priority No. 13 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
Petitioner Kendall Q. Northern (hereinafter "Northern"), by 
and through his counsel Haley & Stolebarger, hereby submits this 
Reply Brief in support of his appeal from a decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals affirming judgment of the Third District Court for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
Petitioner, Kendall Northern, is entitled to the extraordinary 
relief sought based upon this Court's decision in Foote v. Utah 
Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). The Board of Pardon's 
own rules require that a hearing be held prior to rescission of a 
parole date and that an inmate be informed of the charges against 
him. see Rule 310. The Board failed to comply with these rules in 
rescinding Northern's parole the day before he was to be released, 
without notice of the allegations of misconduct or rule violations, 
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without a hearing that indicated that Northern would present "a 
serious risk or danger to the community/1 or without providing 
Northern with any information pertaining to any "new evidence" the 
Board had in its possession. 
Moreover, the "new evidence" that the trial court found may 
have been relied upon by the Board was not "new evidence" at all, 
even as the trial court defined new evidence: "negative 
information." see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 8, 
attached to petitioner's opening brief as Addendum A. This evidence 
- a recent psychological report, a report pertaining to an incident 
of drug use in February of 1988, and Northern fs drug use before and 
after the commission of his crime in 1980 - was either known to 
the Board and its agents prior to May 9, 1988, and knowingly not 
acted upon, or was not negative information, or both. 
The Board's decision to rescind Northern's parole date the day 
before he was scheduled to be released, in violation of its written 
policies and procedures, was an abuse of discretion and violated 
Northern's due process rights and his liberty interest in his 
parole date. The Board had no rational, lawful basis in the record 
to support its conclusions, and its actions were arbitrary and 
capricious. 
What is at issue here is the correctness of the Board of 
Pardon's actions in light of the facts and/or evidence the Board 
had before it in making its decision. A decision made and actions 
taken upon a Board's determination that an earlier Board was not 
harsh enough in meting out punishment to an inmate is not a lawful 
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basis upon which to rescind a release date under Rule 310; the 
inmate's liberty interest in his release date and the binding force 
of the rules outweigh a Board's desire to increase the punishment 
previously set. 
The facts concerning the procedures followed by the Board have 
been "flushed out" in this case, see Foote at 745. Based on this 
Court's decision in Foote, the facts reveal that the Board of 
Pardons denied Northern his due process rights under article I, 
section 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution. As 
such, extraordinary relief is appropriate, and Northern is entitled 
to have the actions taken by the Board at the July 8, 1988, hearing 
declared null and void, and the order of restitution issued by the 
Board in 1992 vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
NORTHERN IS ENTITLED TO THE EXTRAORDINARY 
RELIEF REQUESTED BASED ON THIS COURT'S 
DECISION IN FOOTE V, UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS. 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(e) (1992), Northern is 
entitled to the extraordinary relief requested where the 
respondent, Board of Pardons here, fails to "regularly pursue its 
authority," as defined by the statute and agency rules in place at 
the time in question. The Board of Pardons' own rules require 
notice be given and a hearing held prior to rescinding an inmate's 
parole date. The rules further provide that the inmate be informed 
of the charges against him and the reasons for the Board's ultimate 
decision. 
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Northern, however, was not provided with notice, nor was he 
given a hearing prior to the rescission of his parole date. He was 
also provided with no information concerning the reasons for the 
Board's actions. Even for the July 1988 rescission hearing that 
confirmed the Board's actions of May 9, the Board did not inform 
Northern of any violations or allegations of misconduct. At a time 
when the Board could not have claimed extraordinary circumstances, 
it still did not comply with its own rules. The reasonable 
inference is that it acted outside the scope of its written 
policies and procedures, relying upon its opinion that it could 
rescind a parole date at any time for any reason until the moment 
an inmate walked out the prison gate. As such, the Board denied 
Northern the due process of law required under article I, section 
7, of the Utah Constitution, and this court's decision in Foote v. 
Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). 
It is clear from this Court's decision in Foote v. Utah Board 
of Pardons that the due process clause of the Utah Constitution 
applies to the Board of Pardons. This Court stated that: 
the parole board is not outside the constitutional 
mandate that the actions of government must afford due 
process of law. 
* * * * * * 
there is no question that habeas corpus review of the 
board of pardons' actions is available. 
Id. at 735. However, the Court in Foote left open the question of 
"[p]recisely what due process requires of the board of pardons," 
stating that such a determination can only be made "after the facts 
concerning the procedures followed by the board are flushed out." 
Id. The facts concerning the procedures followed by the Board in 
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this case have been flushed out through an evidentiary hearing, and 
reveal that Northern has been denied due process of law. 
a. The State's reliance on Preece v. House 
is misplaced. 
The state first cites to Preece v. House, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 
28 (Utah App. 1993), apparently for the proposition that the proper 
remedy here would have been an order reguiring the Board of Pardons 
to follow its own procedural rules, and provide Northern with a 
hearing. Under the state's analysis, because a hearing was held in 
July 8, 1988, albeit almost two months after Northern's parole date 
had been rescinded, the violation of Northern's due process rights 
was somehow remedied. This is simply incorrect. 
The decision in Preece, however, is inapposite to the claims 
raised by Northern. In Preece an inmate, upon learning that an 
incorrect guideline had been applied in setting his release date, 
challenged his continued imprisonment past the date which should 
have been set if the proper guideline had been applied. Id. at 28. 
The Board had affirmed, without written explanation, the release 
date set using the incorrect guideline, and the inmate filed a writ 
of habeas corpus seeking his release. Id. The district court 
thereafter ordered the inmate's release "forthwith." Id. 
The Court of Appeals found that although petitioner was 
entitled to a written explanation of his parole determination, the 
district court exceeded its authority in ordering the release of 
the inmate. Id. The Court held that: 
the appropriate remedy for the procedural due process 
violation found bv the district court in this case is to 
require the Board expeditiously to provide the district 
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court and petitioner with a written explanation of its 
reasons for the parole decision. 
Id. (emphasis added). The court1s holding is a narrow one, based 
solely on the "procedural due process violation found by the 
district court in [that] case." Id. Had the court intended its 
holding to apply to any and all perceived due process violations, 
rather than the narrow violation found by the district court in 
that case, it certainly could have drafted its opinion to make such 
an intent clear.1 However, in light of the court1s narrow 
holding, it cannot be said that the due process violations in 
Northern's case could be remedied by a subsequent hearing. 
b. The procedures followed by the Board of 
Pardons denied Northern due process of law. 
The procedural due process violations here center around the 
Board's failure to give timely and proper notice of a decision to 
rescind Northernfs May 10, 1988, parole date. The May 1988 Board of 
Pardons Rule 310-2 read as follows: 
310-2. Procedure 
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing date, 
information shall be provided to the Board establishing 
the basis for the rescission hearing. Upon receipt of 
such information, the offender will be scheduled for a 
rescission hearing. Except under extraordinary 
circumstances, the offender will be notified of all 
1
 Northern's case is also distinguishable from Preece in that 
Preece was not provided with an explanation by the Board as to 
reasons for its decision. Thus, the facts in Preece had not been 
flushed out, as petitioner there did not know the procedures used 
or facts relied on by the Board in making its determination. In the 
instant case the Board did provide a written basis for its 
rescission; however, its basis were contrary to law, public policy, 
its own policies and rules, and the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. 
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allegations and the date of the scheduled hearing at 
least seven days in advance. 
(emphasis added). The facts of this case demonstrate that there 
were no "extraordinary circumstances" to justify the Board's 
"temporary" rescission. As set forth in Point 2, there was no "new 
evidence" that Northern posed a serious risk or danger to society. 
In fact, the evidence established the exact opposite. 
Moreover, the Board is required to provide Northern with the 
seven days notice and hold a hearing prior to rescinding Northern's 
parole date. Even assuming, arguendo, that extraordinary 
circumstances exist this does not waive the Board's requirement of 
providing notice and a hearing, contrary to the state's argument; 
it merely permits the hearing to occur on fewer than seven days 
notice. Under any circumstances Northern was entitled to some 
notice of the allegations against him and he was further entitled 
to notice and a hearing prior to having his parole date rescinded. 
In Byrnes v. Oregon State Board of Parole. 750 P.2d 499 
(Or.App. 1988), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the State 
Board of Parole had improperly reset petitioner's prison term by 
failing to comply with its own rules regarding proper notice, and 
reversed the Board's action. Id. The statute in question provided 
that an inmate's prison term determination could be reopened for 
one of the grounds enumerated in the statute, such as "substantial 
new evidence." Id. at 499-500. After first determining that none of 
the enumerated grounds were present, the Court went on to state 
that even if one of the enumerated grounds were present, the Board 
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was still bound by the statutory requirement of 14 days1 advance 
notice. Id. at 500. 
Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court, in Monohan v. Burdman. 
530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975), recognized that an inmate acquires a 
"potential conditional liberty" in a tentative parole release date. 
Id. at 338. The Court stated that: 
once parole or a promise of parole has been granted in 
the form of a tentative release date, we are satisfied 
that the prospective parolee enjoys a unique status and 
is deserving of minimal due process safeguards before 
cancellation of that date for reasons other than failure 
to develop an adequate rehabilitation plan. 
Id. at 339 (citing cases) . In determining what is meant by "minimum 
requirements of due process," the Court looked to the procedures 
set forth in Morrissev v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972), 
requiring, inter alia, written notice of the claimed violation, an 
opportunity to be heard, and disclosure of evidence to be used 
against the parolee. Id. 
Two of the most fundamental notions of due process are notice 
and a right to be heard. Notice is more than the announcement of a 
hearing; for an inmate facing the rescission of his release date, 
it is also notice of the nature of the allegations that have 
triggered the hearing and caused the Board to consider rescission. 
Northern, however, was afforded neither. He was never informed of 
the reasons for the temporary rescission nor provided with an 
opportunity to be heard until the Board announced its decision on 
July 8. A hearing held two months after the fact hardly comports 
with due process of law, let alone the notice and hearing 
requirements of the Board of Pardons1 own procedural rules. 
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POINT 2 
THERE WAS NO NEW EVIDENCE WHICH JUSTIFIED 
THE RESCISSION OF NORTHERN'S MAY 10, 1988, 
PAROLE DATE. 
The Board of Pardons Rule 310 states that a parole date may be 
rescinded if "new evidence is presented which shows that the 
prisoner, if released, would present a serious risk or danger to 
the community." The State claims that "new" evidence existed to 
support the rescission of Northern's May 10, 1988 parole date. 
Northern however, contends that there was no "new evidence" within 
the meaning of Rule 310 to support the Board's action in rescinding 
his May 10, 1988, parole date. 
a. The evidence that may have been relied 
upon by the Board was not "new" within 
the plain meaning of the rule. 
A statute or regulation should be construed according to its 
plain and literal language. Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 
686 (Utah 1989) . The term "new evidence" must be defined as 
evidence which was previously unknown or of recent or fresh origin. 
Ready v. United States Parole Commission, 483 F.Supp 1273 (M.D.Pa. 
1980); Black's Law Dictionary 940 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "new"). 
A review of the record shows that the Board had before it three 
pieces of information that it may have considered on May 9 as new 
evidence.2 The State in its brief does rely on those three pieces 
2
 Because Board member Paul Boyden refused to disclose the 
basis for the Board's decision in his deposition, which was 
admitted as substantive testimony at the evidentiary hearing on the 
writ, this Court must look to the information the Board had about 
its philosophy and sentencing practices in 1988 and the information 
the record demonstrates it had about Northern on May 1988 to 
determine whether it went outside of its written policies and 
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of "new" evidence as the basis for the rescission of Northern's May 
10, 1988 parole date and assumes that the Board did as well, even 
though there is a paucity of evidence in the record to support that 
conclusion. 
The first piece of "evidence" cited is that Northern abused 
drugs before, during, and after the commission of his crime in 
1980. The Board through its counsel would have us believe that 
until the psychological evaluation on May 5, 1988 - which was 
specifically characterized as "FAVORABLE" by the evaluator - it was 
ignorant of Northern's drug problem. However, the record reveals 
that The Board of Pardons undeniably learned of Northern's drug 
problem in the summer of 1984; even with that knowledge in 
September of 1984 they reaffirmed his May 10, 1988, parole date. 
Additionally, the Board, and/or its agents, had ample evidence 
of Northern's drug problem prior to May 5, 1988, when they received 
Northern's first psychological report. Northern had been receiving 
therapy for his drug problem while in prison. Prior to May 5, 1988, 
the Board, through Paul Larsen, had been attempting to work out the 
details of Northern's parole with authorities in Arizona. Continued 
drug therapy was to be a condition of any parole. As Northern has 
procedures to rescind Northern's release date. In the former 
category fall the sentencing matrices that were developed after 
Northern was given his release date in 1981; the Board's policy 
under that matrix of giving longer sentences in 1988 for homicides 
than the 1981 Board meted out; and its statements to Northern in 
the transcript of the July 8 hearing. In the latter category fall 
the factual information about Northern that the Board and the 
prison had and the dates on which it obtained the information. The 
information in these areas, plus the reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, give the clearest reason for Northern's rescission. 
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asserted throughout these proceedings, his drug problem, while 
arguably evidence, was certainly not "new" within the plain meaning 
of the statute. 
Finally, an individual's recognition of his or her drug 
problem is an important step towards recovery. The Board's action 
of punishing such a recognition if such were the case forces an 
inmate with a present or past drug problem to make a Hobbesian 
choice. Either he continues to deny his drug problem, and thus 
seriously hamper any potential recovery, or admit the drug problem, 
only to have the Board of Pardons cite this as "new evidence" which 
justifies rescinding his parole date. 
The second piece of evidence cited by the Board's counsel was 
Northern's use of marijuana on February 25, 1988. This "evidence" 
was also known to the Board prior to May 1988. A report of this 
incident was submitted by the Duchesne Jail, in writing, to the 
prison following the incident as monthly reports were submitted to 
the prison by the Duchesne Jail regarding Northern. It was known to 
the Board prior to May of 1988, and certainly could not be 
considered "new" evidence on May 9. The Board of Pardons, through 
Paul Larsen, continued in its attempts to work out the details of 
Northern's parole supervision with the authorities in Arizona, 
prior to May 9, 1988, after the February incident and with full 
knowledge of Northern's infraction. 
Moreover, subsequent to this incident, the warden of the 
Duchesne Jail, also with full knowledge of the February incident, 
wrote a favorable recommendation to the Board supporting Northern's 
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release. Had this been the information relied upon by the Board, 
the Board would have alleged it as a rule violation, as provided by 
Rule 310-1 which, in pertinent part, reads as follows: 
The release or rehearing date established by the Board of 
Pardons shall remain in effect [except] upon written 
referral indicating that the offender is in violation of 
the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison, 
Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any local, 
state or federal government . . . 
Findings of Fact No. 12. The full text is attached to petitioner's 
opening brief as Addendum A. 
The final piece of evidence allegedly relied on by the Board 
was the psychological report dated May 5, 1988. However, the 
evaluation specifically noted that the Board of Pardons was to 
consider the report "A FAVORABLE ONE." (emphasis original). It was 
not "new," i.e. negative evidence, as Judge Hanson defined it. The 
report found that Northern had shown a great deal of growth and 
maturing and, significantly, he did not have the capacity for 
violent acting out. Despite this report, and with no reasonable 
basis for finding otherwise, the Board determined Northern to be a 
risk to society, and "temporarily" rescinded his parole date. 
Not satisfied with the results of this May 5, 1988, 
psychological report and wanting a negative report, the Board 
ordered another evaluation. Contrary to the wishes of the Board, 
this evaluation also came back favorable. Neither report revealed 
any evidence that suggested Northern presented "a serious risk or 
danger to the community." In fact, perhaps the best evidence that 
Northern was not a risk to society is evidenced by the two years 
preceding May 1988, when he was at the Duchesne Jail working as a 
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trustee. In that capacity, Northern was assigned to work, for 
extended periods of days and weeks, virtually unsupervised, on a 
rural farm owned by an elderly woman. During the period from 1986 
thru May 1988, he worker in other unguarded areas. He did so 
without incident. An individual posing such a "risk to society" 
would surely either have not been given such freedom and 
responsibility, or would not have performed so well in the local 
community. Yet the Board appears to have ignored this information. 
Not to be denied, the Board of Pardons scheduled a hearing for 
July 8, 1988, almost two months after Northern's original parole. 
The Board found Northern posed a risk to society and that more time 
was required so that his punishment would fit his crime, thereby 
formally rescinding his May 10, 1988, parole date. 
As a final coup de grace, the Board in 1992 imposed a twenty 
six thousand three hundred fifty dollar ($26,350.00) restitution 
order on Northern. It did so despite the fact that from 1980 thru 
May 9, 1988, restitution had never been ordered by the Board. It 
did so without notice to Northern or his attorney (whom it refused 
to allow to appear) . And it did so without a scintilla of evidence 
supporting the award, which it based on pure speculation of what 
the widow of the victim would have had to pay for child care if she 
had used child care after the death of her husband. The best and 
most current evidence about child care is in the 1980 ninety-day 
evaluation of Northern, in which Mrs. Hamby noted that she had 
begun to care for children to earn extra money. 
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In setting aside the July 1988 order, the Court ought also 
void the restitution order of 1992, which was improvidently and 
unlawfully entered. Even if the Court somehow affirms the 
rescission order, it should void this speculative, unsupported 
restitution order. 
b. The Board of Pardons acted in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner in denying Northern 
his May 10, 1988, parole date. 
The actions of the Board of Pardons, in "temporarily" 
rescinding Northern's parole date on May 9, 1988, and formally 
denying it at the July 8, 1988, hearing, were so arbitrary and 
capricious as to deny Northern due process of law. It is well 
recognized in the federal system that a decision by the Parole 
Commission may be reversed where the actions of the Commission are 
shown to be arbitrary and capricious and have no rational basis in 
the record, see e.g. Misasi v. United States Parole Commission, 835 
F.2d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 1987); Fiumara v. O'Brien, 889 F.2d 254, 
257 (10th Cir. 1989); Montoya v. United States Parole Commission, 
908 F.2d 635, 637 (10th Cir. 1990); Dallas v. Martin, 929 F.2d 587, 
589 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Differences between the federal parole system and Utah parole 
system notwithstanding, the same principles which apply in the 
federal system regarding arbitrary and capricious acts of the 
Parole Commission also apply to the Board of Pardons in Utah. The 
Board of Pardons is bound by the due process clause of article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution, which is identical to the due 
process clause in the United States Constitution at issue in the 
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i f s e c t i o n 7 7 - 2 7 - 5 (J) w<u. i Ihul In p r e c l u d e dl I 
j u d i c i a l r e v i e w , both by way of law and by way of 
e x t r a o r d i n a r y w r i t s , then t h a t s e c t i o n runs a f o u l of 
a r t i c l e I , s e c t i o n 11 of th* i{ tah C o n s t i t u t i o n , In 
a d d i t i o n , t h e mandate of t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e of 
a r t i c l e I , s e c t i o n 7 of t h e D e c l a r a t i o n of R i g h t s i n t h e 
Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n i s comprehensive in i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o 
a l l a c t i v i t i e s of s t a t e government• 
F o o t e s u p r a a t 73S I I >tnot.p omi t t e d \ III1 • Il i .ubmits t h a t t h i s 
i 1 I ' I I I I I III V III III III III III III I III III 'III Ill Ill III III I I fit. III 111 
Board, even in reaching substantive decisions, as such decisions 
must be rendered in accordance with due process of law and not in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner. 
Furthermore, and contrary to the State's assertion, Northern 
is not directly challenging the Board's substantive decision, 
except as he attacks the procedures and underpinnings used by the 
Board in reaching the decision. Therefore, no separation of powers 
problem exits. As set forth by this court in Foote, the Board of 
Pardons actions are clearly subject to some judicial review. When 
due process rights are implicated it is this Court's prerogative, 
as the final arbiter of state constitutional issues, to determine 
whether an individual has been denied due process of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Northern asks this court to decide whether, in light of the 
record, he was afforded the requisite due process of law, and 
whether the Board "regularly pursued its authority" in so acting, 
or whether the actions of the Board in rescinding his May 1988 
parole date was the result of a Board's determinations that it had 
authority unfettered by an inmate's constitutional safeguards. If 
an inmate has no liberty interest in a parole date, if the Board 
may violate or circumvent its written policies and procedures 
without any consequence or restraint, and if the Board of Pardons 
may rescind an inmate's parole date for any reason all, (such as 
disagreeing with a prior Board's action) - or for no reason - until 
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the moment an i nmate passes through the prison gate then Kendal 1 
Northern loses. 
N i l ) I III III If III I I I I II III III III III III 1 I I I I I | H " ' l l III I I I I i l l 1 I I I II Ill I II l" ! Ill Ill i l l I III i l l Ill III 1 > 
own policies ami proceduii" in I il denial to him of I lit; due 
process protections afforded him by the Utah State Constitution and 
t h i f i i HI in mi II I II in "i i ' . i i ill in in in I uuU1 y, ULdli t i ua id u l JHaidmts i III III 
comi mi i finding arid correction of error, Accordingly, Northern 
asks this court to render the Board's actions in the July ^ I • >''r' 
h e a j mi in in i mi in in mi in III III in mi in I III in I III, ' i ' i in HI . i l l Ill III in mi i i i « III in III in mi III mi i i i 1 1 in in III i mi i / j b u e d l i j I I n 
Boai'd i n 14MV>, .ynil e n t e r o t h e r n e c e s s a r y o r d e r s r e q a r d i n g t h e t e r m 
o r r e n d i t i o n s of p a r o l e e n t e r e d by Llie Board ii| iii I n o r t h e r n ' s 
r e l e a s e 
DATED this /£*^ day 
*~~ct£ully submitted, 
_ STOLEBARGER 
Jo cSrol Nesset-Sale 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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